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China's ForeiQn Policy_jn the Mid-1990s女
1. Introduction 
Significant changes took place in the intemational system in 1989 when China' s foreign 
relations , especially those with the Western wor泊， suffered severe setbacks in 也e aftermath 
of the Tiananmen Incident. Despite the purge of Zhaωo Zi勾ya叩ng 組dh趾1S SU叩pp仰O口巾er吭S丸， who 叭\vere
accused of advocating 
C∞ommun凶1吐ique of the fourth plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Pa訂rt句y (CCP) r叫eleased on June 24, 1989 that 也e policies of reform and opening to 
the outside world " will continue to be steadfastly carried out as before " and that China “will 
never go back to the old closed-door path ',-l 
* In November 1995 , 1 visited the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 
University, the Central Party School, the China Institute for International Strategic 
Studies as well as the Shanσhai Institute of Intemational Studies. 1 held extensive 
。
discussions with over 50 academics and research \vorkers on Chinese foreign policy. To 
facilitate exchange of ideas, they wiU not be quoted directly. Instead, their views will be 
summarized and presented as those of the Chinese research community on China' s 
foreign policy. 
可γ
The 的nmunique of the fourth plenum also reaffinned that rÇhina ~ s independent, self-relian! 
md peaceful Dω叩叫icy yvollld 叫 change， and China would~ on the basis of the _ Five~ 
Ennclp1es3f?prA1lco﹒的istence三 contjnue to develop friendly relations \vith other 
Cou的ies.2 )the Chinese leadership appe訂ed to be just as eager to attract foreign investment, 
-一一一 / 
too. The authorities concemed \vere more willing to concede to reach agreements because 
they felt their bargaining position had been weakened. The 。在icial mass media, too, 
continued to churn out success stories of foreign business ventures in China. 
The CCP Political Bureau made the followinσthree observations on the world situation after D 
the Tiananmen Incident : (a) the Party Central Committee had not changed its basic views on 
the global situation, the trends of detente between East and West had not changed, and 
likewise the triangular relationship among the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China; (b) China 
would continue to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastem European 
countries, but this improvement in relations could not surpass China's relations with the U.S. , 
Japan and the Westem countries; (cr China in the past had been too close to the West and the 
rich countries, and had neglected the 百世rd W orld and the old 臼ends in Africa. China 
therefore should strive to resume and develop relations \vith these old friends. 3 Like the rest 
of the wOrld, the Chinese leaders had not anticipated the significant changes that ended the 
Cold \Var and completely altered the intemational balance. 
2 
r"" 
ln the follo\ving two to three years , Gennany reunified; the former East European satellites of 
the Soviet Union. abandoned socialism and opted for independence; and, finally , the Soviet 
在于
Union disintegrated. ,These developments~ plus the impressive victory of the \Vestem 
countries in the Gulf War, seemed to indicate that the U.S. had become the sole supe中O叭.er
ln 伽 w叫 There was a view in China ir 
C∞oun叫tr可y， ~仁=hina would become the next main target for the “ Pμea仗ce缸扣11 e盯vo叫lu叫tiωon" strategy of 
伽 W卅
supporting Solidarity in Poland in the pas泣t obv叫iously lent suppo口 to such a v吋ie\v. One of the 
notable proponents of this view was He Xin, a researcher of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences and member of the Chinese People' s Political Consultative Conference. ( ln an 
、、、、--﹒
article entitled “The Gulf War and China", he wamed that after the Gulf War, the U.S. 
、 -一-一一_.-
planned to shift its forces eastward to dominate Japan and China and establish an Asian-
Pacific empire.4/ 
戶、
Further, a丘er the Tiananmen lncident, the demise of socialism in the Soviet Union and 
Eastem Europe, the collapse of the Comrnunist regimes in these countries, and the general 
trend of abandoning socialism and opting for capitalism in the Third World all exacerb?ted 
the sense of insecurity among Chinese leaders. • They had to be given credit for not 
responding to the domestic and intemational tunnoil by resorting to radical or isolationist 
s叫es 。叫
leadership of the intemational communist movement and take up the responsibility of the 
fonner So 叮t Uni 叫They were v 的 critical of 伽 a訓t位t叮叩m叫n1甲Pω y川the Uni 削 States and, to a 
lesser extent, by other Westem countries to impose their systems and values on other 
countries, but they consistently pursued their efforts of improving relations with the West 
3 
after the Tiananmen Incident. 
policy of isolation and autarky. 
川A叭
1 They wanted to maintain a peaceful interna60n月LenYironment to concentrate on China ~ s 
modemization y hey considered 伽t intemational competition in 伽 coming decades \vould 
be on the basis of “ comprehensive national po\ver ", and that China had \vasted much 
precious time already. In the first place, China would have to make sure that its economic, 
scientific and technological gap \vith tbe advauced \Vestem C011utγ~ould be narro\ving, 
and not widening. In terms ofper capita GNP, China wOllld like 10 catch up 叫出 the NIEs in 
East Asia too. Further, China had to maintain a respectable growth rate in order to compete 
with the ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Finally, if the East 
European countries were successful in their economic reforms, they could make good use of 
their economic and technological base and could experience an impressive economic tal仗，
off.) 
/γ 
of the _Soviet UniQn iI!!12Eed the disappearance . of the strategic triangle. In v I 、
strategic terms , this meant that China could no longer exploit the di叮erences between the t\VO 
superpowers and play one off against the other. \ Thus, China' s strategic value, in the eyes of 
> J
the Westem countries, would be much depreciated when compared \vith that in the late 
1970s, when Soviet military power reached its peak. Hence the Westem countries \vould be 
less inhibited in criticizing and ex巳~ing pressures on China regarding issues ranging from 
weapons proliferation to trade, human rights, etc such criticisms and pmsum were l( 
worsened by the fact that the newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union all 
4 
turned to the West for aid and guidance, and that the \Vestem media's perceptions of China 
were turned one hundred and eighty degrees by the Tianarunen lncident. 
1、--1
In contrast to the 1970s and the early 1980s, Chine~è leaders did not advocate for the broadest 
~、、、
possible united front against the United States.( They also did not identi令 the principal 
contradiction in current international relati吵 Analyses in the official mass medi~ however, 
令\~一~
tended to predict that the contradictions among the U.S. , the European Union and Japan 
would be sharpening. Economic competition among the single European market, the North 
American market created by the North American Free Trade Agreement and a potential East 
Asian economic bloc would likely replace the military confrontation bet\veen NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. Such analyses and commentaries also highIighted the differences in s甘ategic
interests between the U.S. and the Westem European powers, those between the U.S. and 
Japan, and those among the major Westem European countries. Chinese leaders probably 
appreciated that it would only be futile to appeal to the \Vestem European countries and Japan 
to form a 叫ed fì削 against the U.S.\ Their common interests still outweighed 也elr
contradictions, though the latter would reduce the U .S. ' s capacity to dominate the \vorld. 
/ 
The Chinese leadership ' s world vie\v continued to consider that Washington' s strategic focus 
would remain in Europe and its f1ank, the Middle East. 大ho豆豆h the U二S. em旦旦~ed asth~only 
S旦旦空里9_~~_ in the world afte~J.he Gulf \Var, it \yould not have the resources to play a more 
significant role in the Asia-Pacific region.6 The U.S. would also be handicapped by domestic 
problems which generated demands to reduce resources for its foreign policy. Chinese 
leaders also believed that the end of the Cold War \vould enhance instability and facilitated 
the re-emergence of various territorial disputes, ethnic contradictions and religious conf1 icts. 
5 
Some of these troubles would have an adverse impact on China, as I the 
demonstration effects of the rise of ethnic-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in the 
nevvly-independent Central Asian republics on the national minorities in Xinjiang and Inner 
孔1ongolia.
By 1992-93 , Chinese leaders became more relaxed with both the domestic and intemational (1ì抖v."
front. Deng Xiaoping toured southem China in early 1992 to generate new impetus for 
民rrther reforms and opening to the outside world. Chinese leaders appreciated that the 
legitimacy of the communist regime would depend on its ability to deliver the goods. This 
would be the most important guarantee against a repetition of what had happened in Eastem 
Europe and the Soviet Union. In contrast to their counterp訂ts in these countries, Chinese 
leaders, concentrated on economic reforms Erst aqd were able to significantly improve 的
people's living stand祕 Hence they w竺只ble tol res心e politi叫 stability soon 伽伽
Tiananmen Incident. Three years after the incident, in view of the developments in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastem Europe, most intellectuals in China were ready to accept t1:浮
crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in the surnmer of 1989/1 though they obviously 
believed that it was gravely wrong to resort to the use of tanks and machine-guns. They vvere 
\villing to admit that there vvould be no substihlte for the communist regime. 1 t seemed that a 
vast majority of the people accepted the status quo, for they had an interest at stake to avoid 
the chaos and turmoil that had emerged in Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Deng himself realized that history would be harsh on his role in the Tiananmen Incident, and 
he became impatient with the austerity programme and the 毛主lanc己4 平pp~oach to economic 
d竺三lopment adopted after the political crackdown in 1989. While he rejected political 
6 
refonns which would erode the CCP' s authority and control, he intended to fu口her push 
China dO\Vll伽 road 心rket …ny.Æ心lÌc refonns 叫叫r川 up
momenturn after Deng's southem tour, and foreign investor~ .were impressed by the fact that 
China regained its momentum for market transfonnation so soon after the Tiananmen 
crackdown. A the W旦旦旦旦旦旦Ja w己re三~illi豆豆豆豆!3:?~De.?~__a v?te of confidence. 
The Financial Time~ of London named Deng “ Man of the Year " for 1992, and it noted that 
in that year,“the f10wering of Chinese capitalism that he fostered became irreversible". 7 
China' s foreign relations were back in full swing too. The Chinese govemment worked hard 
at building or restoring its perceived rightful place in the world, and Chinese leaders should 
be satisfied with their achievements by 1993 or SO.8 They were then in a better position to 
re-define their world view. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fading away 
of bipolarity, Chinese leaders believed that a new pa位em of intemational relations was in 也e
pr~cess of emerging. By implication, the present power configuration of “one superpower, a 
nurnber ofm吋or powers" was only transitional. This stage of evolution, ho\vever, might last 
for ten years and more. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese leaders' authoritative 
statements on foreign policy did not comment on the danger of a \vorìd \var. Silence on this 
topic might be constnled as treating this as a non-pressing issue. Instead, in their vie\v, China 
should concentrate on the intennediate and long-term competition in building “ 川1 ‘
comprehensive national power " , and it should not allow itself to fall behind in this fierce 
competition. At the same time, the view that China had become the major target ofthe U.S.'s 
“peaceful evolution" strategy was largely discredited, though it appeared to have secured the 
endorsement of Chinese leaders in mid-1991. Chinese leaders then were highly critical of the 
Bush administration's statements and efforts to spread the Western systems of liberal 
7 
democracy and market economy throughout the \vorld. This position \vas seen to be 
re f1ecting the ne\-v arrogance and self-confidence of the U.S. as the only superpower in the 
world. Obviously, if the Bush administration \vas serious in imposing \Vestem values on 
other countries, China would be a major target:; While there had been considerable emphasis 
in the Chinese analyses on the sharpening contradictions among the U.S. , \Vestem Europe 
and Japan in 1991-92, this was toned do \\tTI in the follo\ving ye位s. As Chinese leaders felt 
more secure, there was no need to give prominent coverage to the contradictions among 
potential enemies. Arguably there were even more troubles in the European Union in recent 
years than in 1991-92, but much fewer commentaries on the difficulties in the Franco-
German relationship, the squabblings between the United Kingdom and other European 
Union members, etc. , appeared in the official media. 
Chinese military leaders were very concemed with the evolving strategies and capabilities of 
the American conventional forces. jfhey noted that the J:!.主巨些笠 planned to 位豆豆豆ts
C旦旦旦旦!世 so that it could handle two regional conf1icts simultaneously instead of one and a 
hal f.
10 (fhe Western countries' attempt to re-define the role of NATO, 10 strengthen the 
military role of the \Vestem European Union and to rely more on intemational organizations 
su川沁忱 Un心《均叫圳圳a前叫圳t吐ωiωlons
People ' s Liberation Army (σPLA) leaders discounted the threat of a \vorld \va缸r or nuclear 丸W、:v訂雪
they found the maintenance of a forward military presence on the p訂t ofthe U.S. in the Asia-
叫region a potenti叫lace. ~n N叫叫 U.S. Secretaηof State Jar叫ker
visited Beijing, and offered reassurances to the Chinese leadership. This paved the way for 
considerable improvement in Sino-American relations a丘er the Tiananmen Incident. 
8 
adjust their bilateral leaders both adopted a pragmatic vie\v to 
自!叫




也While Europe was in tunnoil after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the 
坐坐Eacific_ r_egi旦旦as r三世ivelLP~平左空空!:. I F or China, the most significant military t趾hre叫a剖t，
叫叫…川川d be臼的…e臼I
lncludin2: the Cambodian c∞onili凶~the Af2:hanistan ci討lVl叫i江1 war. the con企ontation in the Korean 
旦旦旦旦Sula， the Sino-Indian border disputes apà the im戶叭 beh，veen the two sides of the 
~\ In tl1~_ early 1990s, the restoration of diplomatic Taiwan Strait‘ had been eased considerabl 
ties with Indonesia was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relation~ . with Singapore, 
Hen仲 in tenns of Israel and South Korea. ßmperor Akibito ofJapan vjsjted Cbjna in 1992 
military security, ~hina p的aps enjoyed a better position in theω!豆豆90s than at any time 一
山U坦2一
.e,lC \ e旦旦旦旦旦~ç~旦!).tradictio!ls among the U.S., the European Union and Japan At the same time 
竺竺e sh位E~豆豆. They r守ognized China as an important market 叫th great potential, and 
Bush neither the Apparently n o 






EL \vould benefit from China believed it 
administration nor the Clinton administration could focus on China after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, problems in Europe and the Middle East seemed to remain Washington ' s 
government had certainly been handicapped by American The focal points. strateglc 
domestic issues and lack of resources in assuming a si 2:nificant role in the Asian-Pacific t:> - ~~~ 
The economic difficulties and decline in living standards continued in the former 
/ 
Soviet Union and Eastem Europe in the early 1990s. \ This enhanced the acceptance of the ' l 
9 
reglon. 
Chinese Communist regime by the Chinese people, and further reduced the significance of 
the Russian threat. 
In sum, in the mid-199郎， the Chinese leadership considered that it had pursued a correct 
foreign p圳r line. ~竺哩recove叫企0叫
1989, and it had adjusted \vell to the evolving post-Cold \Var international environment. 
Meanwhile, the econo.my- continyed.- to~ achieve respectable growth rates. The Chinese 
Academy _ of SQcial Sciences indicated that China \vould become the \vorld' s third largest 
economic power by 2010. 11 Its gross domestic product (GDP) was expected to grow at an 
average annual rate of 9% between 1995 and 2000; and the average annual growth rate would 
些e川lan 7叭叭2001 and 201 
11. Continuities in Chinese Foreign-Policy 
Given the success of Chinese foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s, continuity will 
likely be maintained in the foreseeable future. -The Chineseleadershio will still work hard to 
s~cure a peaceful i n1ρ立lationa 1 environment to proIDote economic development. I 1 t believes 
that the danger for a \vorld war or \vars among major po\vers involving China will be 
relatively insignificant, and international competition \vill mainly be that 0f “comprehensive 
national power". This means that economic diplomacy \vil1 occupy. a prominent role: and it 
G 
will involve 生 following aspects. In the first place, development of good political 











more on economic means to realize its foreign policy objectives. Finally, diplo~atic \vork 
vJι 
1月f1 11 increasingly inc1ude bilateral and multilateral economic CQ叩eration. Cl)!ha not only 
一-一一一一一-一一一一一一一 一一一一一一一一一-~--~ r'一一一
wants to maintain a peaceful international environment, it \vants to create a favourable 
12 
environment in support of its economic modemization. 
Chinese leaders have a realistic assessment of the country' s economic potential. While they 
nonnally express considerable optimism conceming China' s economic outlook~ they are 
淳朴
aware of China' s weaknesses. They do not want to play up various forecasts that China \vill 
become the leading economic power some time in the next centuη. Obviously, in per capita 
tenns, China's GDP in the foreseeable future \vill remain at the level of a developing country. 
China is still receiving aid from the developec;l cQuIltries and ~ants to continue to enjoy trade 
組dρther privileges as a developing country. . Further, Chinese leaders intend to avoid 
encouraging any talk of a 
In the mid-199郎， foreign policy analysts in China consider that the trend to\vards 
multipolarity remains unchanged. In fact, it is probably progressing even more rapidly. They 
note in particular that Gennany's intemational status has been improving and that the 
relationship between Russia and the U.S. has coolled somewhat. The leftist forces in Russia 
have to some extent recovered their strength~ and conflicts behveen Mosco\v and Washington, 
D. C. have increased. It seems that co-operation and competition \vill characterize this 
bilateral relationship in the future. While the political situation in Russia appears to be 
stabilizing, Chinese analysts believe that the contradictions and crises cannot be resolved in a 
fundamental manner in the near future. According to their 0 bservations, the Clinton 
administration has failed to come up with an effective strategy for the post-Cold War era; and 
11 
its a位empts to guide a ne\v Pacific community, too, have encountered much resistance. 1n 
SUIn, Chinese foreign policy experts consider that the global configuration of “one 
superpower, several major powers" is moving towards multipolarity, and they \velcome such 
developments-13 
In the a丘ermath of the Tiananmen Incident, Deng Xiaoping released a number of guidelines 
for Chinese foreign policy. It appe訂s that these guidelines are still respected by Chinese )ð\\.\.d"q \.~ì這 b
leaders, and they 訂e often quoted by Chinese foreign policy researchers in the official think-
tanks. In a talk with leading members of the P訂ty Cen甘al Committee on September 4, 1989, 
Deng stated :“In short, my views about the intemational situation can be summed up in three 
sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, \ve should hold our ground. 
在糾
Third, we should act cáltbry. Don't be impatient, it is no good to be impatient."I4 Earlier in 
the talk, Deng had explained what he meant by “hold our ground~'. He said: “If, while these 
countries (Eastem Europe and the Soviet Union) are in tunnoil, China doubles its GNP in real 
terms for the second time, according to plan, that will be a success for socialism. If we have 
basically realized modernization by the middle of the next centu哼， we shall have further 
reason to叫
Deng recomrnended caution and a lo\v profile too. He said: “Of course, that will put the 
~k ~l人
developed countries all the more on guard against us. Notwithstanding, we should maintain 
Jriendly exchanges with them. \Ve should keep them as friends but also have a clear 
哇n~erstanding of _~vhat they ar~ do~n_g. We should not criticize or condemn other countries 
\vithout good reason or go to extremes in our \vords and deeds".16 Later, in another talk with 
leading members of the Party Central Committee, Deng further stated :“Some developing 
12 
But \ve absolutely' countries would like China to become the leader 0f the TÞli止\Vorld.
\Ve can't afford to do it and, besides, 
~e aren't stro月 en吋 T竺竺f竺三!坐三竺虫旦虫ot史也控旦
lose most of ourln吋1吐itia剖ti廿ve.'六川"川'仆17
cannot do that. This is one of our basic state policies. 
叫no....intention of assuming leadership of the soci 月 lis.LcamD after the、Similarly, çhina had 
abandonment of Marxism . Leninism by Mikhail Gorbachev and the break-up of tl1e Soviet 
Union. Though Deng played a crucial role in the polemics bet\veen the 趴ro communist -----
parties in the early 1960s, he took a very different position in 1990. Deng cornmented on 
March 3, 1990 :“whatever changes j也e plac己 in the Soviet Union, we should steadily 
expand relations 叫th jtæ including political relations, on the basis of the Five Principles of 
m~efrain from 紅皂白 over ideolQ只icaldifTerences"i8 This was in 
accord with the Chinese foreign policy line since 1982 not to define a bilateral relationship in 
terms of ideology. 
Presumably the Chinese leadership today can also endorse another statement by Deng in the 
Sln叫heωlY I\卅bVV\ v
mOs，如d especially 的r 19絨 China has been 吟出g to improve its relations \vi也 its 私仇
Deng said :“As for the two great issues of peace and development, the first has 
, 19 not yet been resolved型 and the second is even more pressing than before". 
same talk. 












restraint certainly facilitated a rapprochement 、;vith Russia soon after the coup in August 
Boris Yeltsin 1991 , during which the Chinese leaders adopted a highly ambiguous stand. 
visited China in December 1992; and in th己 joint statement rissued, ~th countries declared 
that they \vould develop good-neighbourly，企iendly relations of mutual benefit and co-
13 
Russia conc1uded an agreement to settle the disputes concemjng the Westem part of thelJ 
border, and declared that t~ would not aim their strategic nuclear \vea口Qns against each 
些吋iang Zem叫ln叫 V心u昀昀USSl臼划S討…i
t忱hewar缸 a咚咿削g伊伊a剖ln蚓S剖t Fascωm. B酌y th岫e叮n， b切O由 C∞oun吋1仕出le臼S仙n叫ed t血ha仗tt也he竺主芝J型空坦型空刮4 民m叫ed aψgr伊r閃eer
~~~ 
dψ J 
9竺ofth白 4334-km common bo伽.Th立笠ould not e呼ge in c叫onta肋丸 nor wo圳事已。
they fonn an alliance, and their relationship would not be directed _against any third coun叮­
This pa口ern of relationship would last into the next centuη，?t The Chinese Premier, Li Peng, 
also visited Moscow in June 1995,22 and Boris Yeltsin is expected to retum to Beijing in the 
spring of 1996. 
When the Soviet Union disintegrated at the end of 1991 , the Chinese govemment promptly 
竺ogniFed the Russian Federation and the other eleven republicsu Diplomatic主i竺i空空白rith
峙中間re established 均idly. The Chinese government 叫吋 cultivated good r削ons .t 
with these countries and offered them govemment loans and commodity credits. Leaders 
from these countries were invited to visit China and, in 1992-兒， there were top leaders from 
these countries visiting Beijing almost monthly.23 In 1994, Premier Li Peng visited 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Mongolia. During the visit, he 
enunciated the four major principles governing China's relations with the central Asian 
臼均m圳叫P叭川州u由似心bl
p romo叫te eq伊ualit守y~叩nd mut叫ua叫lly beneficial c∞0-0句~叮ra泣叫t討10∞n in pursuit of cOmmon prospe γ吋it吹y土;...1的Q..
旦旦旦Lthe sovereignty an些空空己口end豆nce ofthe 些oples of CentraI Asia through a policy of 
豆型旦-int空些戶凶帥1臼erfì白e叮rer
14 
Friendly relations and expanding economic ties with tbese 仲卅叫A.s.ian neighbours will help ~Y 
'~ v~.) 
China contain the trouble只 from the _na1Ìonal mjnoritj門iILthe provinces and autonomous 
regions in the N orthwest. Negotiations at the expert level have been going on bet\veen China 
on one side and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other on the reduction 
of military forces along the border region 組d confidence-building measures. By July 1995, 
sixteen rounds of talks had been completed, and considerable progress had been made.25 
Fol1owing the departure of Soviet troops in 1992, Mongolia has not been a mjJjtary menace to 
China. The threat has been of a different nature : its demonstration effect on InnerMongolia 
and Tibet as a newly demQcratized counJryricl!ton China's doorstep When Premier Li Peng 
visited Mongolia in April 1994, he stated that he “respected Mongolia' s choice of its own 
development course" . He also denied asking the Mongolian government not to support a pro-
democratic movement in Inn叫0耶叭To demonstrate its 忱pen吋吋der叭 ωala剖i La徊m
was allowed tωo v叫lS訓i江t Mongolia in September 1994, and the Mongolian foreign minister, 
Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren, protested against Chinese nuclear tests in his address to the United 
Nations General Assembly in the follo\ving month. .A.pparently the Chinese leaders are 
willing to tolerate such gestures now that wfongolia is outside the Russian orbit. 
China' s relations with India began to normalize in the second half of the 1970s when they 
resumed the exchange of ambassadors. At the end of 1981 , the tvvo countries initiated 
negotiations at the vice-foreign minister level to resolve their outstanding issues. The break-
through finally came when the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 
r/ 
i心如
1988. The visit was reciprocated by 也at of Premier Li Peng in 1991 . Sino-Indian relations yι0 ， 
Y\'\\咐伽叫
yeceDlρd. a major boost from the disintegration of tbe Soyjet lJnion=- The 1豆豆er could no ' '11 1 ' \..,",,' - \ 
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longer supply lndia with armaments and economic assistance. India also lost its strategic 
value in the post-Cold War era and ~vanted to introduce market reforms. \Vhen the Indian 
Prime Minister P.V.N. Rao visited Beijing in September 1993 , the t\vo countries \Vere able to 
conclude an agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillitv along the line of de facto 
control at the border. A joint working group had been fonned to tackle the border issue after 
Rajiv Gandhi's visit, and various confidence-building measures had been a堅reed u四己
These included scheduled meetings of military personnel on both sides of the border, a “hot-
line" between the military commanders of both sides, mutual notification of military activities 
on the respective sides of the line of de factQ control, etc. Meanwhile, border trade and trade 
expanded?7 It is not expected that the border issue can be resolved in the foreseeable future , 
but the two countries believe that they increasingly share common views on the establishment 
of a new intemational political and economic order, and that there is considerable scope for 
further expansion of trade and economlc co-operation. 
7昀he 叫 of 伽 ω圳il川wa扒r刊ln刊Cam咐b必心a 詛叫d 也臼e n∞onna叫仙l
(斤仁" 1 , \}沁沁川川沁l'戶J..1.. 
represented another achievement on the part of Cbjna to improve relations with its neighbours 
i11 recent yea~. Since the late 198此， China had used i ts status as a permanent member of the 市CO
United Nations Security Councjl to pusb for p月廿布什 De~門ti~tirm，月mang the four parties in 
the Cambodian civil war~ After the five permanent members of the Security Council had 
reached aσreement in Auσust 1990 on the 企ame\vork documents concemin2: the settlement in o-~~ Å~~~ ~~~~- _~_AA_..~... -~-_..._...~ -~~~--~..--~O
Cambodia, China then stopped aid to its allies in Cambodia. ln July 1991 , the four 
Cambodian parties met in Beijing for a \vorking meeting of the Supreme National Council. 
The Supreme National Council delegates were also received by Premier Li Peng. The 
Chinese vice-foreign minister Xu Dunxin, met his Vietnamese counterp訂t， Nguyen Duy Nien 
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in Beijing in the follo\ving month; then in September, the Vietnamese foreign minister ‘ 
Nguyen ìvlanh Cam, travelled to Beijing for further talks \vith the Chinese foreign minister~ 
Qian Qichen. Their discussions facilitated the peace agreement concluded in Paris in October 
1991.28 
The Cambodian settlement paved the \vay for the resumption of full diplomatic relations 
between China and Vietnam in the same year. Premier Li Peng visited Hanoi in December 
1992, at the end of \vhich Li stated言“we have much more common points than disputes~\29 
Negotiations bet\veen Beijing and Hanoi were held on disputes over their common 1 ， 130-kI叮
land border, and some progress was achieved.30 
Since the 1970s, China has been able to maintain fjnendly ties with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan. Though they are not vvithout problems , the 
peace臼1 relationships with rapidly expandingeconomic exchanges has been a kev component 
ln China' s strategy of securing a peaceful international environment in support of its 
modemization. China's relations with Pakistan and B urma haye been Ímproving , t00. 
Finally, China managed to establish diplomatic relations \vith South Korea in September 
1992 without too much alienating North Korea. 1t had ta.tcen more than t\VO years for Beijing 
to fo11o\v Mosco\v' s lead. China no\v supports a dialogue bet\veen the t\vo Koreas and 
a社empts to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula.31 The Tumen Delta development project~ 
sponsored by the United Nations Development Prograrnme, involves not only China and 






There is no reason to doubt that the post-Deng leadership wi l1 continue to value peace along 
China's borders and co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. In the middle of 也is decade ~ 
Chinese leaders still consider that the general 甘end is towards 色旦旦旦， though regional 
conflicts and contradictions may \vell escalate. It is therefore more important to maintain 
peace in the Asia-Pacific region which continues to con甘ibute to the region's spectacular 
economic growth. Troubles in other p訂ts of the world will keep the U.S. and the other 
Westem powers occupied, and will only enhance the relative \veight of the Asia-Pacific 
region in the intemational community. China welcomes multipolarity and the decline of the 
rema1n1ng superpower. 
111. The lmpact of the Leadership Succession 
It appears then that the third generation of leaders have no major incentive to re-define the 
foreign policy line. They are interested in securing and maintaining a peaceful jrltemational 
cnvironment for China' s economic development=-- Their legitimacy will depend on their 
ability “ to deliver the goods", i.e. , to improve the living standards of the people when 
expectations are nS1ng. :eolitical stabili切， the leadership's most important concem in the 
i凶n凶i扯沁t扎山叫i泊凶a叫ly戶ea的r芯s of忱 P仰os泣tι-必n咚g era之Jdep叫s on叭e仗ωC∞on叫om1c gr仰o叫吋h./肉Go∞O沁空豆坐坐!控坐2竺型!旦10的 \\-1泊tl出hCh凶1n沁 弘~rY 
neighbours would also helpto contain the problems of national minorities in the bord~r 
autonomous regions of Xinjian豆~Inner Mongolia and Tibet. 
一J
A number of new factors , however, have emerged in the mid-1990s \vhich will likely lead to 
adjustments in China's foreign policy in the second half of the decade and beyond. In the 
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first place, the !豆豆dersh詛 Sl主豆豆豆豆豆ion 1n China will probably coincide with those in some key 
\Vestem countries. Voters in the U.S. \vill elect a new President at the end of 1996 and 
President Bi11 Clinton' s re-election is far from assured. The Republican-dominated Congress 
wi11 challenge the Clinton administration' s China policy. Taipei will find more room for 
maneuver in its lobbying efforts in the U.S. Congress, which will1ikely attack China' s policy 
to\vards Hong Kong too. Jacques Chirac just replaced Francois Mi位errand as the Fr也ch
President. The British, Gerrnan and Australian governrnents \vill have to call for elections in 
one or two years and they a11 face up-hill battles to stay in power. The political situation in 
Japan will remain unstable for some time. 
Such a scenario reduces the probability for breakthroughs in China's relations with these 
important Westem countries. Their China policies 叫11 become more controversial. The 
Westem media will also be more critical of the Chinese government, as doubts grow about 
China's stability. At the same time, Taipei ' s chance of securing diplomatic victories will be 
correspondingly enhanced, as evidenced by President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Come11 
University in June 1995 , follo\ved by informal visits of Premier Lien Chan to Austria, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic.32 Changes of governments in the Westem countries 'vvill 
create opportunities for discussions of their China and Tai\van policies as well as explorations 
of various options available. At this juncture, Beijing' s stand will likely be inflexible ~ 
because in the leadership succession process concessions and flexibility on the Taiwan issue 
\vill attract strong attacks from one ' s political enemies. 
1n the eyes of the present Chinese leadership and its successors, the \Vestem po\vers, 
especially the U.S. , will likely exploit the leadership succession crisis in Beijing to exert 
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pressure on China regarding issues ranging 企om trade deficits and nucIear-\veapon 
proliferation to human rights. A weak and unstable leadership will find it difficult to 
withstand the pressure pragmatically. Conf1ict \vill easily escalate when competing leaders 
tend to appeal to nationalism and patriotism to mobilize domestic support. There is even a 
view that the third generation leaders in the leadership succession process might seek to 
exploit extemal conf1icts to maintain domestic solidarity or to shift the people's attention 
away from domestic problems and economic difficulties. 
可ι\ W恥叭
The Sino-American disputes over the Taiwan question symbolized by Lee Teng-hui's U.S. 
visit will have long-term repercussions on the bilate叫 relationship. It was reported that liang 
Zemin had been forced to make a self-criticism before the Central Military Commission for 
failing to stand up to the U. S. 33 Even the recall of the Chinese ambassador to Washington, 
D.C. , Li Daoyu, was not considered adequate by the People's Liberation Army and the hard-
34 line Party elders..J~ The missile tests near Taiwan held in late July 1995, however, helped to 
rev竺~~ the p_olitic平1 fortune of Jiang.35 The missile tests were a success臼1 deterrent against 
the independence movement in Taiwan in the short te口九 but they will further alienate the 
people of Taiwan 企om Mainland China. The missile tests also vividly demonstrated that the 
third generation Chinese leaders cannot afford to be flexible on the Tai\van issue. A hard-line 
st型， on the other hand, is 
elders, two most significant allies in the competition for succession. 
The People's Liberation Army apparently adopts a hard-line position on foreign policy. In 
recent ye位s ， the military has been advocating a strong stand on Sino-American relations and 
issues ranging from human rights and nuclear-weapon proliferation to Sino-British quarrels 
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on Hong Kong. It has criticized the Chinese fore這n mr哈叮 for making too many 
已Q且豆豆豆豆ions . On the question of leadership succession, the military leaders will have 
significant inf1uence. They appreciate that Bonapartism would not be acceptable ~ and \vould 
be willing to settle for a king-maker' s role. They \vill likely press for the satisfaction of the 
military ' s demands for more funds and more advanced equipment. 
Regarding defence spending as shown in the budgets, the military has not done well since 
1980. Defence spending in absolute tenns increased by 330/0 in 1979, mainly because of the 
war with Vietnam, then it fell by 13% in 1980 and 1981 respectively. The increases 企om
1982 to 1988 were very modest : 50/0 in 1982, 0.44% in 1983 , 2% in 1984, 6% in 1985 , 4.8% 
in 1986, 4 .4% in 1987 and 4% in 1988. Between 1989 and 1994, the increases were more 
substantial: 15 .40/0 in 1989 and 1990 respectively, 13.8% in 1991 , 14.4% in 1992, 12.7% in 
1993 and 29.3% in 1994. As a percentage of gross national product, ho\vever, defence 
spending steadily dec1ined, from 5.6% in 1979 to J豆豆s th旦旦 1.3 0/0 in 1994.36 F~rther， a 
considerable portion of the increases in defence funding had gone to ~且prove th~ 
remuneration for 型lit也旦豆豆onnel. One estimate indicated that over 35% of the defence 
budget was spent on personnel, and less than 27% on the procurement of equipment.37 This 
is not to deny that there is a hidden defence budget in China~ especially in vie\v of the 
Chinese leadership ' s desire for豆vil-military integration, inc1uding the use of dual-purpose 
infrastructure and organization of supply net\vorks which depend on civilian resources.38 
It was not surprising that, under such circumstances, the People' s Liberation Army' \yould like 
a stable, if not increasing, share of the country's gr豆豆s national Droduct. At the second 
session of the Eighth National People's Congress in March 1994, 104 deputies 企om the 
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military articulated this demand in the form of a signed proposa1.39 1t has been speculated 
that the military has been pushing for a strong stand on the Tai\van issue and Sino-i\merican 
relations in the recent years exactly because it wants increased funding for its modemization. 
---戶一一一一一-\\
The leadership succession process offers an excellent opportunity for the military because the 
third generation leaders lack the status to contain its demand. They are probably eager to 
please the military too , or at least they are reluctant to antagonize such a powerful interest 
group. 
叫m訓山il山伽ita訂叫r
W附O出吋e“d t也ha前t 豆盟垣h昱a's三豆 閃P抖卅1泣已 economlc grQYl帥r廿你~叫吋吋E吋吋翔尋♂哩II川hρ translated into expanding milit的
S甘ength.China' s flexing its muscles in the South China Sea has been a case in point. 1n 
1984 , the then commander of the Chinese na句， Liu Huaqi時， stated in an interview 也at the 
navy' s main goal was to assert China' s sovereignty over its maritime resources, and that to 
protect these resources China had to develop and modemize its navy.40 The Chinese naηr 
obviously used the need to strengthen China's power projection capability over the South 
China Sea to support its demand for enhanced budgetary funding, just like the People's 
Liberation Anny as a whole exploited the Tai\van issue and deteriorating Sino-American 
relations. The Philippine military, too , made good use of the Mischief Reef incident in early 
1995 to secure its Congress's approval ofits budget. 1t has committed itselfto a US$2 billion 
modemization oroσramme over the next five ye訂S-41r~~~ 
The Chinese People's Liberation Army has been playing a typical bureaucratic game of Cl\ l\.\ ~ ItHι 
securing more resources for itsel f. 1ts success will likely contribute to an escalation of 
military ~旦旦di旦旦 in the re旦旦旦~ There is, however, no immediate cause for alann. F or 
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example, Chinese leaders have been exercising considerable self-restraint in the acquisition of 
an aircraft carrier. They \vell understand 也at while it is relatively cheap to buy an aircraft 
carner 企om the : former Soviet Union以fully equipping a carrier task force is very costly. 
一一---\\\
Further, while ASEAN' s military expenditure went up in recent ye訂s ， amounting to USS12.7 
billion in 1994, this to some extent reflected the general prosperity of ASEAN and the 
availability of funds. Th立biggest 缸mS_Q\!yer among ASEAN \v~ Thailan~jL ~主$ not 
involved in the Spratly Islands dispute !}Qr did itxe也eive China as a serious I垣Jjtary_threat. 
The other big spenders were Malaysiit and Singapore, and they too did not feel seriously 
threatened by China militarily. Above all, the political uncertainty in Japan and the economic 
di伍culties in Russia and the other forrner Soviet republics mean that they would not 
participate in an arms race in the near future. It is not in China's interest to provoke them to 
do so. 
d 
Chinese leaders handled the Mischief Reef incident 叫出 care and restraint. They certainly ). 
wanted to retain their Southeast Asian neighbours' benefit of the doubt. But economic 
considerations had provided new impetus for China's expansion of its power projection over 
the South China Sea, beyond the Paracels and into the Spratlys. By the late 1980s, it was 
clear that China \vould soon become a net oil importer; in 1992, it became a reality.43 The 
scramble for oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea by Vietnam and other ASEA卦，
countries reflected the value of the area as well as the potential for conf1ict. Among China' s 
strategic planners, there is a strong view 也at China has to develop and use the oceans in order 
to survive, given China' s huge population and the rapid depletion of its relatively poor land-
based resource endowment. 
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位想例叭1昀削叫叫O叫 仙t仕由伽伽心叭he加恥1咒m…叮叭…r刊ωS叩ou叮肌以r叩ce臼 川η川叫 n叫el句呵妙咐心i氾》敏圳枷gl拉μ伽恥h凶枷枷川1由伽b切O叭1
Burma. The Indonesian military believes that China's access to Burmese bases would pose a 
threat to the Straits of Malacca. l Ildi 'l, on the other hand, has been concemed with Ch品位已\
assistance in building a deep-water 120rt at HainggYL Island, at the mouth of the Irrawaddy 
Rlver.The Indian military suspects that the facility may be used by ~hiIlese submarines o~ 
extended voyages to the Indian Ocean. It was also reported that China had been involved in 
主->+r 丸
building an intelligence base on Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal. The facilities would 
be deployed to monitor shipping and communications in the Malacca Straits and the Indian 
Ocean, as well as Indian missile tests across the Bay of Bengal. Li Peng's visit to Burma in 
December 1994, th豆豆rst~uch high-level visit since 旦旦1 ，-highlighted 也豆豆lQse_ßl世且取吐白
between the two countries-44 
The leadership succession process has affected the Chinese strategic thinking in another 
important way. The informal visit of Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. has much reinforced the 
Chinese leadership ' s suspicion of the U.S. On the surface, both governments appreciate the 
importance of the bilateral relationship. They would like to maintain high-level contacts to 
ayoid misunderstandings and especially an escalation of tension between the t旦旦 cou且tries .
They are aware of the unfavourable factors in each other' s domestic political scene~ namely, 
the leadership succession complications in Beijing, the enhanced political inf1uence of the 
military and its demands, etc. on the part of China, and the challenge of the Clinton 
administr叫on's China policy from a Republican-dominated Congress, the changing 
perception of the American public against China, etc. on the p訂t ofthe U.S. Chinese leaders 
in recent years have a much better understanding of the checks-and-balances system in the 
U.S. , too. Hence, by late August, 1995, the Chinese side could state that "the U.S. side had 
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fully realized the importance and sensitivity of the question of Taiwan to U.S.-China 
relations" .45 In the 1990s, Chinese leaders have been following Deng Xiaoping' s guideline 
that China should avoid a confrontation with the U.S. and improve bilateral co-operation. 
In the Chinese leader泊中's world view, however, many conspiracy theories are gaining 
credibility. Such conspiracy theories are broadly shared by foreign policy researchers and 
intellectuals, too. The first theory is that the Westem countries in general, and the U.S. in 
particular, do not believe that the Chinese leadership succession process will be smooth, and 
they intend to take advantage of China's troubles ahead. Lee Teng-hui ' s informal visit has 
been interpreted in this context. The 1.Z . ~S  and ~h~ ~~ste~  _ ~o~~trie~ would like to use the 
Taiwan issue to exert pressure on China. Their cornmitment to a one-China policy has been 
shaken, and they want to keep their options open in anticipation of China' s leadership 
succession problems. This line of thinking has its historical roots. Back in the 1960s, 
Chinese leaders considered that the U.S. supported the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan to exert 
pressure on China, and that it cultivated the Taiwan independence movement to exert 
pressure on the Kuomintang regime. Related to this conspiracy theory is the strong sense of 
insecurity and suspicion among Chinese leaders conceming the Westem countries “peaceful 
evolution" strategy against China. 
A “peaceful evolution" strategy implies basic hostility towards the Chinese Communist 
regime. While this theme had been down-played since 1992, it re-emerged in different forms (l\ \ \瓜机
in 1995 or slightly earlier. The Chinese leaders are worried that forecasts of China' s 
economlc growth and reports on China' s military modemization and naval expansion would 
be developed into hypotheses of China being a threat or future threat to the peace and stability 
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of the Asia-Pacific region and even of the world戶 The Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef 
in the Spratly Islands and the strong protest by the Philippines in early 1995 triggered much 
discussion of China as a threat. Chinese leaders fear that such perception of the Chinese 
threat would offer support to the renewal of a strategy t。“contain" China. The deterioration ;" ,,",...;:J 
of Sino-American relations in mid-1995 and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations 
between the U. S. 個d Vietnam similarly generated speculation of a "containment" strategy 
-、\
against China 垣itiated by the 11 ~ . 也豆豆旦旦Ported by JaE鎧1， ASEA垃且d ~ietnam ._ Articles in 
popular tabloids and academic joumals in China reporting such a “containment" strategy 
often also argued against further experiments with political and economic liberalization， 的
well as closer co-operation with those countries involved in the “containment"strategy-47 
Obviously such perceptions of the U.S. and China's Asian neighbours have strategic as well 
as domestic political overtones. The latter may well be exploited by factions of the Chinese 
leadership in the leadership succession struggles. In view of the bankruptcy of the appeal of 
socialism and the moral authority of the Party, the third generation leaders often appeal to 
nationalism and patriotism. It is significant to note that in a recent survey by Zhongguo 
。ingnian BaQ of 100,000 young people in their twenties, 57.2% of the respondents chose the 
U.S . as the country to which they had least goodwill, and 87 .1 % considered the U.S. the 
countηr most unfriendly to China. Incidentally, 96.6% of the respondents still felt angry 
about Japan' s invasion of China.48 Chinese people had very good impressions of the U.S. 
after China' s opening to the outside world. Apparently, like the media in the West, there had 
been a reversal of such impressions. Official propaganda and the conspiracy theories 
discussed above were important factors causing this reversal. 
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In terms of foreign policy, these suspicions of the Westem countries have reinforced the 
emergence of the “ strategic triangle" in the strategic thinking of the Chinese leaders, as well 
as attempts to exploit the contradictions among Westem countries. 1n recent years, China 
acquired considerable military hardware from Russia. ,During Boris Yeltsin' s trip to Beijing 
--一，一-一 可自-一 間內闡可 『月廿哼，- 郎_--d _一一--一一一
ln December 1992, he stated that China had bought US$1.8 billion of arms 企om Russia, 
including twenty-six Su-27 fighter aircraft and ten IL-76 heavy transport planes. China also 
purchased four batteries of S-300 high altitude surface-to-air missiles. Since then, it was 
reported that China had secured two to four Kilo-class conventional submarines and another 
batch oftwenty-four Su-27s少 n mid-1995 , when Sino-American relations deteriorated, the 
Chinese government was preparing for the second visit of Boris Yeltsin; and the author' s 
interviews of Chinese foreign policy researchers and Russian diplomats in Hong Kong 
indicated that both countries expected their military co-operation to advance further because 
of the difficulties in Sino-American relations. It has also been typical for Chinese leaders to 
reward Westem countries with lucrative contracts in retum for their sympathetic stand 
towards China on issues ranging from Taiwan to human rights, and to deny such contracts to 
those which have adopted a critical and unfriendly position towards China. Such foreign 
policy strategies and tactics are commonplace in intemational relations, but the Chinese 
h::adership must not allow suspicions of the West to compromise its general objective of 
句酌 'J售 1
securing a peaceful intemational environment for modernization. Sharpening contradictions 
between the U.S. and Japan, for example, are certainly not conducive to peace and stability in 
the. Asia-Pacific region. 
」
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IV Conclusion : Towards a Long-term, Rational Foreign Policy 
In striving for a peaceful intemational environrnent to realize China' s modemization 
programme, the Chinese leaders pursued what they called an indepq生虫1位!~n hpolicy ~f 
peace since about 1982-83.50 It was well sumrnarized by Premier Zhao Ziyang' s ten 
principles, in his report on the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) to the F ourth Session of the 
Sixth National People's Congress on March 25 , 1986.51 Premier Zhao reaffirmed China's 
position of never establishing an alliance or a strategic relationship with any big power, and 
「一一-一-一一一】-一-﹒ 一
that China's relations with various countries would not be determined by their social systems 
and ideolo星空Lqqo also stated that China's position on various international issues would 
些主 guped byt生criteria of d街心g world pea∞， developing relations 。他endship and ∞ 
operation among various countries and promoting international prosperity. Despite the 
Tiananmen Incident and the leadership succession complications, there is no reason to believe 
that these principles will be abandoned in the future. 
Since 1978, economic reforms and opening to the outside world have brought China an r1A川
average annual growth rate of about 90/0. Chinese leaders expect that such a growth rate wiU 
be maintained in the near future and will only dec1ine a little as the economy matures. China 
needs a peaceful international environment, and it will try its best to secure such an 
一一一一一一
environment in the foreseeable future. Despite various forecasts of China being the largest 
economy in the world by 2015 to 2035 ,52 China's per capita GDP will remain at the level of 
a developing countηr for many decades. After all, China's population is nine times that of 
J apan. Even when the Chinese economy becomes the 1訂gest in the world, there is no basis to 
speculate that tt will re-define its foreign policy i!.l a sig旦出cant way. The third generation 
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leaders and their successors will be hard-pressed by the people to 至~ntinue to i_mp..!~ve their 
living standards irrespective of th立progr豆豆~ of Qolitical _Jeform~ The legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist regime will depend on its ability to deliver the goods, and Chinese 
leaders are acutely aware of this. The most optimistic assessment is that, in terms of living 
standards of the people, China will need at least another century to catch up with the 
developed countries. 
C坐虫ilike 阿拉歹 ðee空i1self as a beneficiary of the status guo It wj l1 drastically ex口and its Yl14~ 
Ä1../ l 
rrlilitaηr force only when it experiences a sharp deterioration of the intemational environment. 
That is why it is important for Chinese leaders to convince China' s neighbours of its peace削
intentions, so as to avoid an arms race due to mutual perceptions of military threat. China 
moved quickly to defuse the Spratlys dispute when the Mischief Reef incident caught the 
Asia-Pacific region's attention. In the ASEAN meeting in Brunei in August 1995 , the 
Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, stated for the first time that Beijing would abide by 
intemational law in sovereignty discussions with the claimants.53 President Jiang Zemin 
further wrote to President Fidel Ramos to guarantee that China would be determined to 
主立91ve its dispute with the Philippines over the Spratlys in a peaceful manner. 54 In retum, 
但 \s 、
President Ramos granted pardon to the sixty-two Chinese fishermen who had been jailed for 
six months for poaching in the disputed Spratly Islands.55 Striving for a peacefu! 
intemational environment certainly involves establishing 企iendly relations with one's 
neighbours and avoiding conflicts with them. This has probably been China' s most important 
foreign policy objective since 1982-83 , and it has been achieving satisfactory results in the 
1990s. This means advancing China' s national interest by force or the threat of force \vould 
be very costly. By 1993 , 55% of China's foreign trade was with East and Southeast Asia.56 
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izigg and improving relations with Russia and lndia despite J仰
起立border conf1 icts. .J.t can certainly do so with ASEAN, especially in view of ASEAN's 
importance to China. The Chinese leadership has to be more pro-active though, so as to 
dispel the speculation that China has expansionist schemes in line with its naval buildup, and 
that its policy on the resolution of territorial disputes with its neighbours will change once its 
has achieved the necessary power-projection capability. There are now ample channels to 
strengthen mutual trust and engage in confidence-building. After its first formal meeting in 
Bangkok in July 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum has certainly demonstrated its 
importance as a regional security forum. 
In the field of arms control and disarmament, China's declaration neither to be the first to旦回
q旦旦lear weaR-ons, nor to use theIll ag，!!n~ non-nl!clear countries has \yon considergbl旦旦旦I212QJ1
主 the Third_ World. The same applies to its endorsement of the Latin American nuclear-
weapon-free zone and other similar proposals. But its two nuclear tests in May and August 
1995 attracted many prot帥 China has said that it will tki all nuclear tests 你 the
intemational Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been signed, possibly in 1996. It was 
reported that China had told Japan it would conduct two more underground nuclear tests 
before the Treaty. The Chinese gesture was likely aimed at seeking Japan's understanding 
and persuading Japan not to cut its low-interest yen loan package for China.57 Such a 
position ref1ects a lack of sensitivity to intemational public oplnlon, and probably the 
strengthening clout of the Chinese military. 
30 
To reciprocate China's efforts to re-assure the international community of its intentions for 
peace and development, the Western countries must seek to ayoid exerting unnecessary 
pressure on China during its leadership succession process. Construct1v~_ e Q.~gement must 
involve concrete measures to demonstrate that the Western world has no intention to take 
advantage of China' s domestic problems, including the Taiwan issue; norto “contain" China 
and deny it of the support and access needed for its modernization prograrnme. Given the 
historical factor, it is very easy for Chinese leaders and the Chinese people to feel that the 
Western world and Japan fear competition from China, and do not want China to become a 
strong and wealthy country. ln a recent statement on its China policy, the European Union 
stressed the introduction of China into the mainstream of international economics and politics 
and the avoidance of isolating the country.58 Hopefully, the statement will be followed by 
concrete acts, and an example will be set for the U.S. and Japan. 
ln sum, China' s long-tenn interests and objectives are clear. Since the early 198郎， China has 
been p'ursuiI)g_ a s1.啥?sdIL moderni_zation diplomacy. Chinese leaders had adjusted to the 
difficulties created by the Tiananmen lncident and to the major changes ofthe post-Cold War 
power configuration. Now come the challenges of the leadership succession process. 
Suspicions of Westem countries, inf1exibility on the part of the third generation leaders due to 
the power competition, the increasing influence of the military, etc. may create problems, but 
so far there have been no signs of a major re-definition of the foreign policy line. 
China has not only accepted the existing international organizations, such as the United 
Nations, World Bank, lntemational Monetary Fund, etc. , which it previously considered to be 
t也Is of Westem imperialist powers, it further expects them to play a more significant role 
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and intends to articulate and promote its interests through them. 1t is now the recipient of 
most loans from the World Bank, US$22 .4 billion by the end of June 1995. 1t anticipates 
another US$9 billion in the coming three years.59 However, it has been shying away from 
active leadership in these organizations. 1n the first place, it considers itself a major power 
a旦d a developing country, and it has no intention of leading the Third World. Second, it still 
su旺ers from a lack of seasoned diplomats and intemational civil servants. It must overcome 
these handicaps in order to assume an appropriate role in intemational affairs. This 
eventually will improve China's image and erode its suspicions ofthe West. 
Finally, Çhina_ ~ust soon come up with a coherent regional policy, given its recognition of 
the increasing significance of economic regionalism and regional trading blocs. 1n 1991 ~ 
China became a dialogue partner of ASEAN, a member of the Asian Pacific Economic Co-
operation, and expressed support for the Malaysian proposal for an East Asian Economic 
Caucus excluding the U.S.60 Directions for an institutional framework strengthening 
economic co-operation among East and Southeast Asian countries are still very f1uid, but they 
will have an important impact on the roles ofthe U.S. and Japan in the region. China cannot 
afford to be left out in shaping this institutional framevvork, but its position is yet unclear. 
This is certainly an area where the third generation leadership can leave its mark. 
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